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The history of phishing traces back in important ways to the mid-1990s when hacking 
software facilitated the mass targeting of people in password stealing scams on America 
Online (AOL). The first of these software programs was mine, called AOHell, and it was 
where the word phishing was coined. The software provided an automated password 
and credit card-stealing mechanism starting in January 1995. Though the practice of 
tricking users in order to steal passwords or information possibly goes back to the 
earliest days of computer networking, AOHell's phishing system was the first automated 
tool made publicly available for this purpose. 1 The program influenced the creation of 
many other automated phishing systems that were made over a number of years. These 
tools were available to amateurs who used them to engage in a countless number of 
phishing attacks. By the later part of the decade, the activity moved from AOL to other 
networks and eventually grew to involve professional criminals on the internet. What 
began as a scheme by rebellious teenagers to steal passwords evolved into one of the 
top computer security threats affecting people, corporations, and governments. 
 
1. Prelude to Automation 
In 1994, there was a small community of people on America Online who were self-
identified computer hackers. I became part of this community, at age 16, and was 
known under the pseudonym “Da Chronic.” Many of us were friends and we lived in 
various parts of the country. One constant requirement for all of us was maintaining 
our free and anonymous access to the service. At some point during the summer of that 
year a fellow hacker, Dave Lusby (Soul Crusher), explained to me the method he had 
developed to trick AOL members by posing as an employee of the service. In this way he 
would gain access to their accounts and credit cards. Similar to today's phishing 
schemes, it involved tricking someone into trusting you with their personal information. 
In this case, a person who had just logged on to cyberspace for the first time would be 
fooled into giving up their password or credit card information. Stealing accounts in this 
manner became my primary way of maintaining access to the service.  
This early scheme was the basis for the automated tools that would be developed in the 
following year. One of us named it "fishing," the term that I later used in AOHell along 
with a change of spelling to "phishing." 
 
 
                                                          
1 Though I do not know of any cases, it is plausible that some had previously developed tools for their own 
use in order to automate their scams, such as shell scripts that spam email (bait) to a large number of users 
at one time. 
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1.1  How it Worked 
AOL gave little or no warning to their customers about password and credit card 
scammers in 1994 and for most of 1995. The "New Member Lounge" chat rooms were 
our primary target areas since they were the rooms in which new subscribers were 
placed during their first few logins. Many people occupying these areas had only a few 
minutes of experience online, so they were some of the most vulnerable targets an 
attacker could want.2 The method was as follows: 
1. Obtain an anonymous AOL account by creating one using a fake bank account 
number or credit card, or use an account that was stolen in a previous attack. 
2. Create a screen name on the account that appears official (e.g. BillingDept).3  
3. Write the "bait" message which will explain to users the need for us to "verify" 
their passwords or billing information. For example: "Hi, this is AOL customer 
service. Due to a problem with our records, we need you to reply to this message 
with your current password in order to avoid being disconnected."  
4. Locate a New Member Lounge chat room and open its occupant list. 
5. Send a private message containing the bait to each person in the room. 
Steps 4 and 5 are repeated until the account is terminated by AOL security staff 
(typically less than five minutes). 
 
1.2  Motivation & Weak Security 
Though one could already obtain free access to AOL by creating accounts using fake 
credit card numbers, these accounts would only last a short time before AOL closed 
them when it attempted to verify the billing information. This made stolen accounts 
                                                          
2 Since this is a technical description of early phishing, I am using the term "target" to refer to the people 
being victimized. The desire is not to depersonalize the nature of these attacks as the real lives of people were 
(and are) affected by phishing scams. 
3 Creating screen names that would appear to belong to AOL employees was hampered by AOL's efforts to 
block the creation of screen names containing certain key words. Some examples are names containing 'AOL', 
'billing', 'TOS', 'account', etc. To circumvent this, we would use “visual deception”: slightly misspelling the 
word while keeping it similar enough so that targets would not notice (e.g. spelling 'AOL' with a zero or 'billing' 
with two capital Is instead of lower case Ls). 
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much more valuable as they were being paid for by legitimate subscribers. 4 Stolen 
credit card information was valuable to us for creating accounts on other online 
services that required verification of billing before the account was activated, such as 
The Sierra Network, CompuServe, GEnie, and Delphi.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Password and Credit Card Scam Process 
 
 
                                                          
4 These accounts were later referred to as "phishes." While a stolen account was more valuable than an 
account made using fake billing information, there were still problems with using them. AOL would allow only 
one screen name to be online at one time. If a user tried to login to his account while a screen name 
associated with it was already online, he would receive a message explaining the situation and informing him 
to call AOL's customer service. This is how many subscribers discovered that they had been duped by 
someone pretending to be an AOL employee, and this is how most phished accounts were "lost." The most 
valuable phishes were naturally ones belonging to subscribers who rarely signed in to their accounts. During 
this period AOL charged $3.50 per hour of online time, so many subscribers would discover what had 
happened after receiving a large bill. 
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AOL's lax verification system gave us free and anonymous access to their service from 
which we could target legitimate customers, a security weakness that would later 
become crucial in allowing massive numbers of people to engage in automated attacks. 
Much of that could have been prevented if AOL had implemented an automatic billing 
verification system similar to the ones found on the much smaller online services.5 
Throughout 1994, only a small number of us engaged in the "fishing" scheme–Lusby 
and I, and perhaps a few others. This would change the following year when AOL 
hacking software started to become popular, and our small underground community 
grew enormously due to both the software and AOL's growing subscriber base. I started 
the development of this software in late 1994 with another programmer, and by early 
1995 I had developed an automated phishing system.  
 
2. Automatic Phishing  
Figure 2 shows the configuration screen of the attack system included with AOHell. 
Here the person chooses from built-in bait messages or creates his own. Messages are 
automatically sent to AOL subscribers asking for their passwords or credit card 
information. So that a novice could use the system, a Help button was prominently 
displayed which provided information on the concept and explained how to use the 
system to effectively steal passwords and credit cards.  
The first recorded uses of the term phishing are found here in the program's two 
interface windows as well as in the documentation. (Both spellings are used; with an "f" 
and with "ph.") 
                                                          
5 However, AOL was much more concerned with unhindered growth rates even if the growth was not 
completely real. AOHell would later provide a function that would create these pre-verified accounts 
automatically for the user. This resulted in the creation of tens of thousands of fake accounts, many of which 
were used for stealing real accounts. This could have been prevented by a simple billing verification system. 
Even at this early time such systems were common among online services and merchants. AOL announced its 
position on its weak security when Vice President Kathy Ryan stated that "[AOL understands] that our 
aggressive distribution of both software and certificates can result in 'throwaway' accounts. We have made the 
business decision that the benefits in this case outweigh the disadvantages." AOL was also reluctant to warn 
its customers about the threat of phishers during the first few months of AOHell-related phishing attacks. See 
David Cassel, "Hackers, Netscape, Death of AOL?," AOL Watch Mailing List (2 April 1999), 
(http://www.aolwatch.org/list/0101.html). 
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 Figure 2: AOHell's Phishing Configuration Screen 
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Figure 3 is an accurate re-creation of a phishing attack in progress from the phisher's 
point of view. Messages are quickly sent to occupants in a chat room. The user waits for 
each person to be sent a message. He is then prompted to locate the next chat room to 
phish. The phisher targets room after room until the account is terminated by an AOL 
employee. He makes no actual communication with the targets himself. Incoming 
replies appear only briefly on the screen and are logged for later retrieval. 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: Automated Phisher in action on Windows 3.1 and AOL 1.1 
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2.1 Phishing Made Easy 
AOHell performed many functions useful to hackers and software traders and gained 
widespread usage very quickly. The program included as one of its features an 
automated phishing mechanism starting in January 1995. One of my objectives in 
making the program was that it should be used by a large range of people, from 
experienced users to people who had very little computer knowledge. The design 
approach was to assume that the user knew nothing about a particular procedure.6 The 
phishing configuration screen (Figure 2) offered the user detailed documentation 
through a Windows Help file that explained what phishing was, what the person would 
gain by doing it, and how to get the best results from the automated system, such as 
choosing appropriate screen names. An easy to use graphical interface was provided 
along with the detailed instructions.  
The user-friendly aspects of the program were crucial to the process in which phishing 
became such a widespread phenomenon. Not only could hackers and others with 
experience use the system, but anyone who was willing to follow some instructions and 
press a few buttons could phish. A very large number of people, who would not have 
otherwise engaged in such activity, became efficient password and credit card thieves 
with little knowledge and work required. These individuals would be aptly referred to as 
"script kiddies" in today's vocabulary.  
2.2 Operating the Software 
Like the scheme from the year prior, the operation of the automated system was not 
complicated. The software included six customizable bait messages, three each for 
password and credit card-phishing. The user would decide what he wanted to phish for, 
open a chat room occupant list, and start the phisher. The program would then send 
the bait to the people in that room one by one. After the last person had been sent a 
message, the user would open another room's occupant list and start the system again. 
Incoming messages from targets were removed from the screen, after being logged, to 
prevent interference with the process. 
Once the automated system was started, there was little for the user to do except to 
periodically redirect AOHell to new chat rooms and wait to be disconnected by AOL 
security. AOL was usually diligent in disconnecting the phisher quickly. This was partly 
                                                          
6 A major goal in writing AOHell was to gain a user base not just within AOL's hacking community but, more 
importantly, to get users from outside this community and thus increase its size by recruiting and educating 
new people. This was extremely successful as the popularity of AOHell and similar programs were largely 
responsible for growing the warez, hacking, and programming communities to a point where they reached 
thousands of participants. For each new release, and periodically in between releases, I would spam a copy of 
the program, along with a layman's description of the things that it could do, to every person in the Teen Chat 
rooms. This was a very effective way of getting new people to use the program as email spamming had not yet 
come about. Phishing was one component of the software, but most AOL teenagers were drawn by the other 
advertised functions such as the ability to "punt" their friends offline or the ability to scroll ASCII art in the 
chat rooms. 
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because the software would inadvertently send bait messages to AOL employees sitting 
in the chat rooms. Both the automated and the earlier manual attacks would typically 
last less than five minutes before the phisher's account was terminated. Since the time 
available for an attack was so short, automation provided a huge increase in results. 
With the aid of the software, perhaps a dozen chat rooms with up to 23 people each 
(200-300) could be targeted before the phisher was disconnected from the service. 
2.3 Big Rewards with No Risk 
Unlike today's phishing schemes which operate in an environment that has over fifteen 
years of phishing history, these early attacks had a very good success rate against their 
unsuspecting targets. The high success rate was also due to the unique operation of the 
New Member Lounge areas, as previously mentioned. On busy nights, and on occasions 
when AOL staff were not so diligent, many passwords or credit cards could be phished 
in a single session. 
Because the phishing was done on fake or stolen accounts, there was no substantial 
risk to the attacker of being caught by AOL or the police. 7 AOL relied on outside 
networks such as SprintNet for their telephone-modem connectivity, and these 
networks did not provide AOL with the incoming telephone number of the person 
logging in, say, through Caller ID. AOL later created or purchased its own modem 
network called AOLNet, but apparently it too did not retrieve the incoming telephone 
number. 
 
3. Phishing Evolves 
Over the course of 1995, AOHell's phishing system was used in thousands of attacks. 
They continued and multiplied when software with similar functionality became 
prevalent. I stopped development of AOHell that September, but by this time there were 
already dozens of similar programs, many of which contained innovations and 
improvements. Many hundreds of these programs were developed over the course of 
several years, and they helped to create and support large underground communities 
on AOL. Phishing continued to be a major activity on AOL throughout.  
Most of those involved with phishing on AOL were teenagers who were not well 
organized but who took part in loose communities. Software trading, developing 
underground software, and phishing were done for fun and peer acceptance. During the 
later part of the 1990s, people within these communities brought phishing to other 
services on the open internet, such as instant messaging and video game networks. 
There is much more to say about the period of widespread phishing on America Online, 
the large number of people involved, the diversity of the underground communities, and 
the motivations and histories behind them. 
                                                          
7 Many years later, some AOL phishers were caught and prosecuted such as Helen Carr. 
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Since the transition period from AOL to the internet, phishing, while never morally 
correct, has largely become an activity of organized criminals done for monetary gain. 
Beginning roughly in the early 2000s, phishers have used increasingly sophisticated 
methods to steal money from people and financial institutions. While an early phishing 
attack on AOL targeted a small number of people in an attempt to steal passwords or 
credit card information, a modern phishing attack on the internet can involve millions 
of targets in an attempt to steal entire bank accounts, or worse. Estimates of the 
annual costs of phishing to people and businesses range from tens of millions to 
billions of dollars per year. 
Phishing would still exist today had it not first appeared on a massive scale on America 
Online in 1995, though it would be called something else and would have different 
forms and character. A worthwhile project would be to examine the evolution of 
phishing by tracing in detail its departure from AOL to other online networks. This 
would include an examination of many of the hundreds of software tools available from 
1995 to the early 2000s when phishing became widespread on the internet.   
 
